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I review the data on human visual perception that reveal the critical role played by non-
visual contextual factors inﬂuencing visual activity.The global perspective that progressively
emerges reveals that vision is sensitive to multiple couplings with other systems whose
nature and levels of abstraction in science are highly variable. Contrary to some views
where vision is immersed in modular hard-wired modules, rather independent from higher-
level or other non-cognitive processes, converging data gathered in this article suggest
that visual perception can be theorized in the larger context of biological, physical, and
social systems with which it is coupled, and through which it is enacted. Therefore, any
attempt to model complexity and multiscale couplings, or to develop a complex synthesis
in the ﬁelds of mind, brain, and behavior, shall involve a systematic empirical study of
both connectedness between systems or subsystems, and the embodied, multiscale
and ﬂexible teleology of subsystems. The conceptual model (Multiscale Enaction Model
[MEM]) that is introduced in this paper ﬁnally relates empirical evidence gathered from
psychology to biocomputational data concerning the human brain. Both psychological and
biocomputational descriptions of MEM are proposed in order to help ﬁll in the gap between
scales of scientiﬁc analysis and to provide an account for both the autopoiesis-driven search
for information, and emerging perception.
Keywords: autopoiesis, distributed cognition, dynamical systems, embodied cognition, embodiment, enactivism,
motivated perception, situated cognition
“Es ist nicht zu leugnen, daβ auf die Dauer über jeden Einzelnen dieser
großen Zwecklehrer bisher das Lachen und die Vernunft und die Natur
Herr geworden ist: die kurze Tragödie ging schließlich immer in die
ewige Komödie des Daseins über und zurück, und die “Wellen unzäh-
ligen Gelächters” — mit Aeschylus zu reden — müssen zuletzt auch über
den größten dieser Tragöden noch hinwegschlagen1.”
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 1882.
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft.
Erstes Buch, 1, “Die Lehrer vom Zwecke des Daseins.”
INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with complexity in vision. Its purpose is to exam-
ine how conceiving complexity – in this speciﬁc case – implies to
generate (largely generic) intellectual tools, which allow gathering
and synthesizing data emerging from mind, brain and behavioral
sciences.
From a behavioral point view, as well as from an anatomical-
physiological point of view, vision can be studied in relation to
non-visual processes (e.g., basic homeostatic loops, emotions,
higher-level cognition, pathological events, social-economical fac-
tors). Here, I am presenting a perspective on vision that builds
on previous work on enactive (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson,
2010; see also Stewart et al., 2010; Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2012; McGann et al., 2013, for a view on the diversity of recent
1This quote is provided in English and discussed in the context of my theoretical
proposal, later in the text.
enactive research), embodied (Clark, 1999; Chemero, 2001, 2009;
Thompson and Varela, 2001) and situated (Clark, 1997; Noë,
2009) cognition trends, empirical data in experimental psychol-
ogy,works in theoretical integrative biology (vonBertalanffy,1951;
Weiss, 1963; Chauvet, 1993a,b,c, 2004; Kozma et al., 2005), and
recent research in the neuroscience of brain connectivity. I focus
the work on the various ecologies in which vision is embedded,
including the organism’s subsystems demands. The contexts inwhich
biological vision emerge are multiple, and can be described at dif-
ferent scales. At this point of science development, these scales
range at least from the cellular level to the social-economical level.
Theoretical and empirical data suggest the need to consider multi-
layered context as a predictor of behavioral and phenomenological
activities of vision systems. In contrast with some previous views
on enaction, I promote the principle of bottom-up teleologi-
cal inﬂuences that weigh on visuomotor processes – in order to
integrate the various couplings between biological processes.
The basic properties of the Multiscale Enaction Model (MEM)
are conceived from the principles of emergence. As opposed
to many approaches to psychology research, this model identi-
ﬁes multilayered contexts, which co-constitute mental processes.
Similar general reasoning has been applied to theoretical biol-
ogy. As reported by Weiss (1963, p. 389), the analytical process
by which a cell is decomposed into its constituent atoms and
ions does not provide much information about the difference
between a live and a dead cell: “In trying to derive the more
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complex systems from their elements, therefore, one must make
up for this deprivation somehow by restoring the lost properties.
The practice of doing this through symbols, such as ‘organiza-
tion’ or ‘integration,’ is an old one, but seldom makes explicit
as to whether these symbols are meant to be ﬁnal logical pos-
tulates to compensate for the limitations of pure reductionism
or merely provisional promissory notes that they will ultimately
yield to analytical resolution.” Because the problem’s essence of
cellular unity is tightly linked to “the indispensable cooperative
existence of all these features” (i.e., genic replication, contractil-
ity, respiration, selective permeability . . .). In the same vein, the
problem of organization in psychology has often been conceived
at an abstract cognitive/psychic level, through the intervention
of “executive functions” and different “memory,” representa-
tional systems. The thesis underlying the conception of MEM
is that the mainstream tendency consisting in evoking dei-ex-
machina as the loci of control of behavior (see Bruner and
Goodman, 1947, for early critics of this tendency) conducts
to consider the functioning “laws” of cognitive “structures” or
“functions” as the central task of cognitive psychology, whereas
these “structures” have been inferred in speciﬁc contexts, yield-
ing speciﬁc couplings within the individual and between the
individual and the external environment. This process is asso-
ciated to both a foundational tunnel vision and amnesia. The
tunnel vision refers to the neglect of complexity and multiscale
connectedness. Complexity generates cognitive and behavioral
variability at the macroscale. Instead of seriously considering
this complexity and coordinative processes at a more elementary
level, the privileged process is to conceive centralized struc-
tures of control and to deﬁne variability as error (in relation
to the “standard” behavior initially modeled). Then, the amne-
sia refers to the forgetting process of the foundational context,
in which the “rules” or “laws” of cognitive structures were
inferred. Progressively, “structures” and “functions” get increas-
ingly autonomous from other elementary connections at a lower
level.
The central feature of MEM is its sensitivity to multi-layered
context. I deﬁne the “context” of any biological unit of inter-
est as any other elementary (or groups of) living or non-living
material or symbolic objects, which, through their connected-
ness with the ﬁrst biological unit, may inﬂuence its activity.
Hence, there is an acquaintance relation between MEM and
previous embodied (i.e., accent put on the bodily context),
enactive (i.e., special interest in the sensorimotor contingencies,
and sometimes in the autopoietic process), and situated (i.e.,
inseparability between cognitive processes and their context of
production, the latter being conceived at different scales as a
function of the authors) approaches. These approaches all have
different interests. However, the originality of MEM also lies in
the ﬂexibility that accompanies the scale level attached to the
considered context. The multiscale character of the model lies
in its ability to connect perceptual activity to a wide range of
contextual inﬂuences, whose level of abstraction can considerably
vary.
The procedure that is employed in this article consists in
gathering empirical evidence for promoting MEM as a uni-
fying paradigm within psychological science. A discussion of
its detailed properties as well as its links with theoretical inte-
grative biology models is proposed in the ﬁnal part of the
paper.
In the following lines, I successively review seminal and
foundational approaches to dynamics and systemism in visual per-
ception, gather recent empirical works that implicitly or explicitly
give evidence for multiscale couplings between visual behaviors (or
phenomenology) and various other systems, and report neuro-
science ﬁndings that inform us about how brain networks support
integrative cognitive processing. Finally, I summarize salient fea-
tures of MEM: multiple connectedness, embodied, multiscale,
ﬂexible teleology, as well as emergent and dynamic operational
couplings. Potential impacts of MEM on both a synthesis in the
ﬁeld of brain and mind sciences, and psychological intervention
in complex and real settings are discussed.
THE CHALLENGING VIEWS OF EMBODIED AND
CONTEXT-SENSITIVE VISUAL PERCEPTION
There has been a long history of exchanges between the ﬁelds of
psychology, biology and computer science. These relationships
have inﬂuenced the way cognitive psychologists themselves have
considered perceptual and cognitive abilities. In the classical and
radical computational-symbolic approach to human cognition,
which heavily relies on mental representations, visual-perceptual
information is ambiguous and requires further cognitive inter-
pretation and enrichment from the observer. In this framework,
the impenetrability of perception (Pylyshyn, 1999) is explicitly or
implicitly established. On the explicit side, some authors defend
hypotheses such as the informational encapsulation of early vision
(Raftopoulos, 2001). The data that are discussed throughout the
current paper, in contrast, highlight the need to build a theory in
which visual processes are seen as coordinated and emerging phe-
nomena. I want to present existing data on humans that show how
vision is coordinated with other systems and to take the case of
vision as an opportunity to develop a proposal for a ‘modern syn-
thesis’ in the sciences of mind. Thanks to the coordinative property
of mental and neural nets, vision systems behave as real intelligent
systems by continuously adapting to the current goals of the agent.
A PATH TOWARD SYNTHESIS: FIRST SYSTEMIC APPROACHES IN
PERCEPTUAL PSYCHOLOGY
Over the last few decades, many disciplines in science have been
increasingly concerned with the consideration of complexity and
dynamical non-linear phenomena (Capra, 1997; see Beer, 2000,
for the case of cognitive science). This has also been the case
of psychological approaches to vision. In cognitive psychology,
one of the ﬁrst trends concerned with the consideration of the
dynamic nature of visual perception was the "New Look" stream,
whose prominent ﬁgures were Jerome S. Bruner and Leo Post-
man (see Bruner and Postman, 1949, for an overview). The basic
idea developed in the 1940s was that visual perception in humans
was connected to other psychological systems that constitute the
observer’s global personality. Building on the statement that per-
ception should not be studied independently from “the rest of
the dynamical system that constitutes the person,” Bruner and
Goodman (1947, p. 33) claimed what the psychological study of
perception should be: “the problem is, indeed, to understand how
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the process of perception is affected by other concurrent mental
functions and how these functions in their turn are affected by
the operation of perceptual processes.” This was clearly a strong
proposal characterized by the systemic concern developed by the
authors. At the time, many other approaches, actually considered
the perceiver as if it was a rather passive recording instrument.
“One might, in most experiments, describe him in much the
same graphical terms as one uses to describe the latest piece of
recording apparatus obtainable from Stoelting or the American
Optical Company. Such psychology, practiced as it were in vitro,
has fallen short of clarifying thenature of perception in everyday life
much as did the old nerve-muscle psychophysiology fall short of
explaining behavior in everyday life”(Bruner and Goodman, 1947,
p. 33). What the authors criticized in their paper was also the
discrepancy between the lab situation and the marketplace. In
everyday life, many factors interact and change the perception
that emerges. In order to understand those changes, we must
give credit to variability and analyze its underlying mechanisms.
One major obstacle to the development of the approach of the
authors in the years following their publication was probably
the relationship of a lot of researchers to variability, which was
often considered as noise or as being associated to the effects
of “attention.” Bruner and Goodman (1947) also questioned
the latter concept, which usually prevents researchers from get-
ting further into the causes of variability, and especially into the
description of the relationships between perception and other
systems. That is, by invoking a deus-ex-machina, one does not
make signiﬁcant progress in the description of what system really
dynamizes perceptual activity. By invoking attention as a cognitive
structure, perceptual psychologists sometimes avoid consider-
ing perception as an open system, or to be more precise, avoid
considering that perception forms systems with non-perceptual
processes.
Bruner and Goodman (1947) investigate perceptual processes
in the context of social-economical needs. In one of their tasks,
they asked poor and rich children from Boston to evaluate the
size of coins. Participants had to manipulate a knob, which con-
trolled the diameter of a projected circle of light. When they
judged that the diameter of the projected circle was equiva-
lent to the one of the coin they had in the palm of the left
hand – at the level of the light, and six inches to its left – then
the trial was over. Results showed that all the participants over-
estimated the size of coins, but this overestimation was more
important among the poorer than among the richer children.
Interestingly, other children took part in the experiment in the
“control condition” in which coins were replaced by medium-gray
cardboard disks of identical size. In this condition, no overestima-
tion was reported. The perception of similarity of sizes between
two objects that are simultaneously available in the visual ﬁeld
is inﬂuenced by both the ﬁnancial needs of participants and the
value of stimulation. The variability of visual similarity perception
across participants can be understood if we consider perception
in the broader context of social-economical factors. That is, the
emergence of visual perception is dependent upon the initial con-
ditions of the perceiver. The sensitivity to initial conditions is a
basic property of dynamical systems that will be discussed later
on in this paper. In order to better understand the evolution
of those initial conditions and their potential impact on the
emergence of visual perception, I will go on with the review of
systemic vision models. Understanding sensitivity to initial con-
ditions implies to develop a conception of the connectedness of
perception to other systems. In the next paragraphs, I build on
the discussion of different systemic trends in order to provide a
synthetic conception of the place of perception within the living
organism.
THE GIBSONIAN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION:
IDENTIFICATION AND CRITICS
One other major approach in the systemic views landscape is eco-
logical psychology. Gibson (1950, 1966, 1979) proposed to study
perception as an embodied process that coupleswithmotor action.
He assumed that we could not understand perceptual adaptation
to the world if we isolate perceptual activity from motor abili-
ties and actions. The systemic nature of the approach lies in the
tight association between perception and action. Gibson’s research
seems to be founded on basic postulates: (1) the human subject
and the environment should be modeled in their reciprocal infor-
mation; (2) relevant information is made of “invariant” optical
elements and gradients (of texture, speed . . .); (3) perception – a
pick-up process of (environmental) optical invariants – informs
us about our relation with the environment and is directly “mean-
ingful” in terms of potential actions (i.e., affordances). The
systemic nature of the approach is well illustrated in the descrip-
tion of action-dependent perceptual invariants. For instance, as
a function of your heading direction, the nature of visual ﬂow
will qualitatively vary. More speciﬁcally, the focus of expansion
(FOE) – which is the optical point from which a radial pattern
of velocity vectors develops – evolves in the visual ﬁeld as a func-
tion of heading direction. The FOE signals to the observer the
current heading direction. If the observer’s movement changes
such that the heading direction also changes, then the place of
the FOE changes accordingly. Action creates information. Here,
we realize that perception must be understood in relationship
to action. Gibson proposes a synthesis between perception and
action in order to predict both perceptual and motor activity as
a function of each other. “We must perceive in order to move,
but we must also move in order to perceive” (Gibson, 1979, p.
223). The observer’s ability to detect this kind of change (i.e., the
position of the FOE) is allowed by the intrinsic nature of sen-
sory systems, which are formatted to be sensitive to gradients of
velocity.
One of the most advanced steps in recent ecological studies is
the production of “laws of control” which mathematically bind
perceptual information and motor parameters in order to give an
account for the way humans control movement, on the basis on
perceptual information. This has been accomplished by unifying
the ﬁelds of ecological psychology and dynamic systems theories
(Kugler and Turvey, 1987; Lee, 1998; Warren and Fajen, 2004). For
instance, Warren et al. (1986) modeled human motor regulation
of running over an irregular surface. The task constraints implied
that participants adjust step length as a function of the demands
of the irregular terrain. The authors showed that motor action
could be regulated on the basis of the available visual data in the
optical ﬂow, which was created by the runner’s motion. While
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approaching the irregularities of the terrain, the observer experi-
ences the optical expansion of those objects. The time-to-contact
(tau or τ; Lee, 1980) can be extracted from this cue, since the
time-to-contact is given by the inverse of the relative rate of visual
object dilation. Furthermore, Warren et al. (1986) demonstrated
in their study, that for adjusting step length as a function of irreg-
ularities, participants could adjust step duration as a function of
vertical impulse (I) [given that mass (m) and gravity (g) are quasi-
constant] by using optical information derived from τ, that is, τ,
which is the difference in time-to-contact between two surfaces:
I = m.g .τ (1)
This kind of control-law illustrates well the very strong coupling
between the current movement and available visual informa-
tion, and that critical information for subsequent coordination of
movements can be extracted from this dynamical change in visual
stimulation. Information is available in the pattern of change of
stimulation as a function of time, so that vision is non-dissociable
from and – in our own terms applied to those data – enacted by
the current motor context of the organism.
More recent empirical research using virtual reality in humans,
such as the study by Warren et al. (2001), have also proposed
some kinds of elaborate control-laws, for instance to explain
how humans guide locomotion to a goal. In this type of law,
ﬂow information is combined to another visual information,
which is the egocentric direction of the visual goal. The reported
control-law is a linear combination of ﬂow and of the per-
ceived direction of the visual target, weighted by the magnitude
of ﬂow (Warren et al., 2001). Among recent developments, and
beyond modeling of human behavior and applications in neu-
ral networks, ecological psychology has also found an allied in
behavior-based robotics (Arkin, 1998), speciﬁcally in a Gibso-
nian trend (Duchon and Warren, 1994, 2002) sometimes so-called
“ecological robotics” (Arkin et al., 1998; Duchon et al., 1998). For
instance, Duchon and Warren (1994) noted that laws of control
were applicable to any moving agent (see, for recent instanti-
ations of the principle in the critical context of autonomous
airborne navigation, Serres et al., 2006; Franceschini et al., 2007).
In their paper, Duchon and Warren (1994) proposed two laws
of control that they tested on an actual robot that evolved in an
unmodiﬁed ofﬁce environment. The laws concerned the obstacle-
avoidance problem. Building on previous studies conducted by
Gibson in humans on the one hand, and by Srinivasan and
Gregory (1992) in insects on the other hand, the authors pro-
posed to implement their two laws of control, which respectively
corresponded to the Balance Strategy and to the Avoid-Closest
Strategy. The ﬁrst one acts to equate the rate of optic ﬂow in
the left and right halves of the visual ﬁeld, whereas the sec-
ond one, inspired from the previously presented tau variable,
makes the agent turn from the place of the visual ﬁeld with
the lowest time-to-contact. They reported that, globally, their
robot succeeded well in avoiding obstacles while moving in a real
environment.
However, a major limitation of the Gibsonian ecological
approach, especially in psychology where humans are modeled,
lies in the reduction of the system in which vision is embedded,
to a two-dimensional (perception-action) scheme. Though the
central point of this paper concerns the systems in which vision
is hypothesized to be contextualized, the direct character of
perception in Gibson’s approach should be shortly discussed
here. Information, according to the ecological approach, is con-
ceived as being unambiguous and specifying directly affordances,
which are perceived opportunities of action in a given envi-
ronment, and given the biological properties of the organism.
Those biological properties are related to the ones that under-
lie opportunities of motor action (e.g., the height of the leg,
which is reported to the height of a stair in order to determine
whether the latter is ‘climbable’; Warren, 1984). The environ-
ment is processed and measured in relative units, as a function
of biomechanical and physiological properties of the perceiving
organism. What I want to defend here is that this is just one
single kind of embodied and context-sensitive vision. Neverthe-
less, vision is not only sensitive to the motor properties of the
organism. Although the Gibsonian ecological approach is sys-
temic, it has a “single-scale” focus of analysis. I would rather
suggest adopting a “multiscale” approach to context-sensitivity.
In order to develop this view, I will provide the reader with exam-
ples related to different scale levels in the analysis of contextual
inﬂuences.
ZOOM OUT! COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE MULTISCALE ENACTION MODEL
This multidimensional view on the determinants of vision relies
on the acknowledgment of the complex interplay between vision
and non-visual factors. Therefore, I will review empirical studies in
humans showing the inﬂuence of basic appetitive drives, biome-
chanical constraints and fatigue, mood and affective processes,
higher-level cognition and cognitive expertise. These inﬂuences
will be studied as a function of their type (i.e., an impact on
phenomenological experience per se, or an early inﬂuence on
the orientation of visual sensors). Each factor of inﬂuence will
be considered as a contextual parameter that should not be
neglected, when one wants to understand and/or inﬂuence human
perception.
THE SEE-WHAT-YOU-NEED EFFECTS: BASIC DRIVES MODIFY
SENSITIVITY TO VISUAL STIMULATION
Some relations between basic drives and perception have been
studied in the ﬁeld of neuroscience through the concept of alli-
esthesia (Cabanac, 1971, 2006), showing that hedonicity was a
central component in behavioral regulation. At the sensory level,
the same individual differently evaluates a given stimulation as a
function of his internal equilibrium, and according to the prin-
ciple that what is pleasant is what is useful. Therefore, while the
state of the organism is evolving, the hedonic relation to a given
stimulation simultaneously evolves. This phenomenon has been
known as alliesthesia under the inﬂuence of Cabanac.
More speciﬁcally, in the ﬁeld of vision, Changizi and Hall
(2001) proposed to test the differential effects of salt and water
ingestion before a judgment task where the transparency of differ-
ent categories of stimuli had to be evaluated. Immediately before
the judgment task, the 37 participants distributed in the thirsty
group ate one lunch bag of salty chips (35 g, 190 kcal, 350 mg
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1425 | 4
Laurent Multiscale Enaction Model (MEM)
sodium) whereas the 37 participants distributed in the non-thirsty
group were supposed to drink water until not thirsty. Stimuli were
then presented through a stereoscope. Three categories of stimuli
were tested (i.e., stimulus with high probability that it is due to a
scene with a transparent surface: “deﬁnitely transparent”; ambigu-
ous stimulus for which probability that there is a transparent
surface is neither very high nor very low: “ambiguously trans-
parent”; stimulus with very low probability that it is caused by a
scene with a transparent surface: “deﬁnitely not transparent.” Par-
ticipants used a computer mouse to press a “transparent”button if
they perceived a transparent surface, and to press a “not transpar-
ent” button if they did not perceive a transparent surface. Results
showed that the experimental ingestion had a signiﬁcant effect
for the “ambiguously transparent” stimuli. Participants belonging
to the “thirsty group” exhibited a greater inclination to perceive
transparency than the participants belonging to the “non-thirsty
group.” The authors’ theoretical framework is both probabilis-
tic and utilitarian. Probabilistic because the derived percept is
hypothesized to be the best “bet” on the basis of available stimula-
tion, and utilitarian because the best “bet” depends not only from
what is most probable, but also from the costs and beneﬁts of the
stimulation for the organism. Changizi and Hall (2001) interpret
their experimental data, stating that salt ingestion conducted to
change the utilities attached to visual stimulation and that thirsty
participants tended to be more sensitive to transparency because
that is a typical visual property of water; and water is the element
needed by thirsty participants. In our terms, visual processing
would embody basic needs in order to satisfy the current goals of
the organism. This shows the need to develop our understanding
of motivational inﬂuences over vision and visual judgment (see
also Balcetis and Dunning, 2006, 2010, for a complementary view
of such inﬂuences).
Visual judgment, when considered at the psychological level,
is highly dependent on what occurs at the physiological level. If
psychological performances on the one hand, and physiological
loops involved in hydration regulation on the other hand, are
not considered as coordinated parameters, and if they are not
conceived synthetically, the meaning of cognitive judgment does
not emerge. In the latter case, there is an epistemological gap
between cognitive processes, which are described as a sequence
of decontextualized operations, and the rest of the body to which
they actually refer.
CARRYING HEAVY LOADS AS WELL AS FATIGUE MAKE YOU
OVERESTIMATE HILL INCLINATION
Other authors have also proposed a framework providing insights
into how visual information processing in humans can be inﬂu-
enced by internal dynamical factors. Profﬁtt (2006) and his Group,
from the University of Virginia, developed a theoretical frame-
work, as well as an experimental program on the impact of
observer’s physical potential on visual judgment. According to
Profﬁtt (2006, p. 110), “[v]isual perception is not solely a visual
process. What one sees in the world is inﬂuenced not only by
optical and ocular-motor information, but also by one’s purposes,
physiological state, and emotions. Perceptions are embodied; they
relate body and goals to the opportunities and costs of acting in
the environment.” According to the researchers, perception and
judgment would express the opportunities of acting in the envi-
ronment. Instead of “coldly” and stably judging physical values of
environmental dimensions, we would do it as if we were intend-
ing to physically act in the environment. In one of their classical
experimental situation, participants are asked to judge the incli-
nation of small hills. Profﬁtt et al. (1995) investigated the ability
of humans to estimate the inclination of those hills as a func-
tion of three response modalities. Individuals were either required
to answer verbally, or they would give their response by visually
aligning a disk such that the inclination of a part of the disk was
equivalent to the inclination of the hill, or they would manipu-
late a haptic device (i.e., a palmboard) without controlling the
device visually. The authors found that the participants generally
overestimated hill inclination in both verbal and visual modalities
but not in the haptic one. Estimations affected by overestima-
tion concern measures of “explicit awareness,” according to the
authors. Explicit overestimation of slant would be useful because
it would promote “a heightened sensitivity to differences in the
small inclines that people can actually traverse” (see Profﬁtt, 2006,
p. 113). The position is evolutionary in nature. The eye probably
integrated evolutionary pressures concerning not only optics but
also other factors that would express the economy of action and
the subjective value associated to acting in a particular environ-
ment. In this vein, Profﬁtt et al. (1995) similarly demonstrated that
physical exhaustion changed the amplitude of slant overestima-
tion. In one experiment, they recruited regular runners and asked
them to evaluate different hills’ inclination before and after difﬁ-
cult run training. In both visual and verbal modalities, the angle
judged after running was signiﬁcantly higher than before running.
This pattern of results suggests that participants visually and ver-
bally evaluate inclination as if they were projecting to physically
move toward the summit. Here, the physiological context of the
organism leads to biased visual judgment as a function of motor
availability of participants. This has been conﬁrmed since by other
studies showing that wearing a heavy backpack lead to the same
types of overestimations (Bhalla and Profﬁtt, 1999).
What this kind of data suggests is that visual judgment is funda-
mentally context-sensitive, and this context can be, among others,
the biomechanical constraints as well as the current physiological
state of ﬁtness of living organisms.
ARE YOU HAPPY? THEN YOU ARE READY TO CLIMB THE HILL AND TO
SEE THE GLOBAL PICTURE!
In a more recent study, Riener et al. (2011) manipulated partic-
ipants’ mood and placed them subsequently in the previously
presented protocol of slant evaluation. Further evidence for an
embodied perception of spatial environment was provided. Par-
ticipants in a sad mood reported hills to be steeper. Riener
et al. (2011) interpret those data in terms of energetic potential,
which leads to anticipate more or less subjective cost associated to
climbing the hill.
Other protocols investigate the impact of mood on the varia-
tion of similarity judgments of hierarchical (compound) stimuli.
Building on a psychophysical-like task proposed by Kimchi and
Palmer (1982, global-local focus test), Gasper and Clore (2002),
in their second experiment, investigated the relationships between
mood induction and the weighting of global and local factors
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of visual similarity. After inducing respectively happy, neutral,
and sad moods in three different experimental groups (using a
writing procedure of autobiographical events), they asked par-
ticipants to perform the similarity judgment task. In this task,
three compound stimuli were simultaneously presented: one at
the center above the two others, which were located respectively
on the left and on the right of the display. Participants were sup-
posed to decide which, among the two ﬁgures presented below,
was the more similar to the above presented shape (i.e., refer-
ence shape). One of the two options was globally similar (e.g.,
globally a triangle) to the reference shape, and the other one was
locally similar (e.g., made of small squares) to the reference shape.
Results showed that participants in negative mood were less likely
than individuals in a positive or neutral mood to use the global
form as a basis for matching the objects. The experiment therefore
indicates that visual similarity judgment is inﬂuenced by mood
state.
According toClore andHuntsinger (2007)moodmoderate nat-
ural or spontaneous tendency. Positive mood would correspond
to a “GO” signal and negative mood to a “STOP” signal. In the
case of the present task, the natural tendency would correspond
to the global processing (see Huntsinger et al., 2010, for a comple-
mentary discussion). Mood, as a dynamic affective state, acts as
a coordinative contextual factor for visual perception in humans
that eventually determines how visual detectors are oriented, and
what is actually seen.
THE EXPERT EYE MOVEMENT AND COGNITION-PERCEPTION COUPLING
The orientation of the eyes is one of the earliest stages of vision
organization, on which contextual non-visual parameters can
intervene. In the trend of expertise research, several studies have
shown that (i) experts deploy their eye movements differently
from more novice individuals, in their domain of expertise, and
(ii) the nature of cognitive expertise is coupled with the type
of visual search that is employed. Reingold et al. (2001) con-
ducted research on chess expertise and eye movement. They
demonstrated in a check-detection task that experts have a greater
visual span for structured conﬁgurations of games. Chess experts
extracted information from both foveal and parafoveal regions
and were able to process interpiece relations. They produced
a fewer number of ﬁxations per trial than other participants.
The other interesting and synergic point is that experts had a
higher proportion of eye ﬁxations that fell between individual
pieces rather than on the pieces. Those data on the larger visual
span in experts were congruent with others collected in a change
detection task, combining the ﬂicker and the gaze-contingent win-
dow paradigms. Expertise decreased change blindness, but only
when patterns where structured and corresponded to real, possi-
ble game situations. Taken together, these results clearly indicate
that visual search strategies in experts are different from those
found in novices or in intermediates. The expertise of an individ-
ual heavily constrains what he looks at and how wide his visual
span can be.
In the same vein, Laurent et al. (2006) reported data on visual
search strategies in expert and novice basketball players. Partic-
ipants performed a same-different judgment task of schematic
basketball scenes pairs. Participants were asked to decide whether
the two scenes – that were sequentially presented – were identi-
cal or different. Differences were local distortions of the position
of zero, one, two, or three player(s) on the playground. Results
showed that expertsmade fewer errors than novices and that visual
search in expert basketball players was poorly sensitive to local
distortions in contrast to what was found in novices, where the
number of eye ﬁxations on the second conﬁguration was linearly
and negatively correlated to the number of local elements that
were displaced. Therefore, it seems that experts have a consistent
and rather relation-oriented visual search, whereas novices have
an attribute-oriented visual search.
All these data are important to the present development
on context-sensitive vision, since eye-tracking research in the
ﬁeld of expertise is congruent with former studies on exper-
tise focusing on higher-level mnemonic processes. The latter
already showed that experts had a superior ability in recalling
or recognizing structured patterns of game. The coordinative
nature between cognitive and lower-level perceptual processes has
already been developed elsewhere (Laurent and Ripoll, 2009).
Through some processes such as categorical perception, per-
ception becomes attuned to critical visual features that are
diagnostic of higher-level successful categorizations (Goldstone,
1994; Schyns et al., 1998). Therefore, cognition and perception
become coordinated, not only because cognition exploits percep-
tual information, but also, because vision becomes coordinated
with the needs of cognitive activity. The coordination suggests
that cognition is also, as it is the case of other processes devel-
oped in the preceding paragraphs, a dimension of the ecology of
vision.
Data belonging to this (non-comprehensive) review on the
inﬂuences of non-visual processes over vision serve to illustrate
the recent empirical endeavors that should be taken into account
in order to discuss the classical view of cognition as a set of pro-
cess restricted to a “sandwiched” layer between sensory inputs
and motor outputs, (see also, for such a critical discussion of
the classical view; Varela et al., 1991; Stewart et al., 2010). Note
that in this classical view, sensory and motor processes are rarely
regarded as “cognitive.” In opposition to those postulates, percep-
tion and action, in this article, are regarded as basically coupled
with the organism goals or, to avoid confusions about any hypoth-
esized abstraction level of “goals” in organisms, in other words,
the teleological dimensions of the organism subsystems. All the
dimensions of the human being that represent some pressure in
order to achieve the equilibrium of the organism and to change
its internal state or the state of its coordination with the environ-
ment (e.g., thirst, emotions, higher-level motivations) embody the
teleology.
So far, I have addressed arguments that should help us reﬁne
our understanding of the nature of vision. Vision, though often
regarded as“hard-wired,” essentially bottom-up, is, as other“later”
cognitive processes, embedded. Visual perception and behaviors
emerge from complex interplays between different biological, psy-
chological, and social dimensions. Modeling variance of behaviors
and phenomenal processes implies to put these processes into
their context. One major obstacle in this perspective lies in the
increasing analytical decomposition of research objects, as well
as probably in the institutionalization of disciplines and scientiﬁc
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careers involving speciﬁc objects and methods that might be too
narrowly deﬁned. Therefore, psychological concepts usually tend
to get proximal explanations in the primary ﬁeld of expertise of
researchers. However, as demonstrated just above, many dimen-
sions inﬂuence a given psychological process; and the lack of
conceptual integrationdecreases thepotentials for a synthesis. This
synthesis is needed in order to get a uniﬁed approach to human
psychology, and to prepare future psychologists to the diversity of
dimensions they could usefully model and modify in the complex
real world.
In order to get further into the formalization of the multi-
ple couplings involving different scale levels, I will discuss recent
biocomputational developments. These developments may have
non-marginal inﬂuences over our quantitative representations of
networks, connectedness, and their transformation with time,
and could help us reﬁne our representation of the coordination
between processes and scales of analysis.
ZOOM IN! BIOCOMPUTATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MEM
APPLIED TO VISION
STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY: BASIC PROPERTIES
FOR CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES IN THE BRAIN
The dynamic processes that have been described so far at the
psychological level are speciﬁc cases of complex interactions.
Properties of complex networks have been studied in biologi-
cal and computational neuroscience (Scannell and Young, 1993;
Scannell et al., 1995, 1999; Sporns, 2011). The complexity of net-
works, deﬁned as interconnected nodes, lies in their size, and
in the interaction between network’s architecture and dynam-
ics (Sporns et al., 2004). Both the behavior of individual nodes
and the architecture of their interconnections give rise to a global
equilibrium and to behaviors. A major conclusion of these anal-
yses is that the brain is a highly integrative system (Tononi et al.,
1998; Tononi, 2004). Full delineation of brain structural and func-
tional connections is currently an object of effort for a group
of scientists who work on the deﬁnition of “human connec-
tome” (Sporns, 2011, 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Van Essen, 2013;
Van Essen et al., 2013).
At the structural level, data coming frombiological and compu-
tational neurosciences, neurology and neuropsychology not only
revealed speciﬁc roles attached to brain areas in the process of
vision (Zeki et al., 1991; Tootell et al., 1998; Rolls and Deco, 2002),
but have also recently shed light on the “anatomical hubs” present
in some brain regions (He et al., 2007; van den Heuvel and Sporns,
2011, 2013), among which we ﬁnd parts of the visual cortex.
He et al. (2007) founded their works on the analysis of covaria-
tion in cortical thickness, because they assumed that covariation
could be due to “mutually trophic” inﬂuences. These covariations
were previously found to associate visual cortex, lateral geniculate
nucleus, and optic tract (Andrews et al., 1997), a network critical
to the emergence of visual representations. Based on this method-
ology, He et al. (2007) revealed that brain networks are made of
“small worlds,” short- and long-range connections usually found
when human diffusion imaging is used. The structural architec-
ture of neural networks seems to be highly related to functional
activity and information exchange through neural nets. Some dis-
eases such as some forms of Alzheimer disease (AD) provoke a
disruption in neural pathways, including visual system’s networks.
This can occur from the primary visual cortex level to visual asso-
ciative areas (Morrison et al., 1991). In those cases, impairment at
the structural anatomical level has direct consequences upon func-
tional connectivity: elementary integration of visual information
is weakened.
At the functional level, studies have been developed in order
to account for complex biophysical coordinations between brain
areas (Varela et al., 2001), or even between different brains (Dumas
et al., 2012). Rodriguez et al. (1999) studied how the synchro-
nization of oscillating neuronal spikes occurs in the brain in the
frequency range 30–80 Hz (i.e., gamma oscillations). In their
experiment, participants viewed ambiguous stimuli, which could
be perceived either as faces or as meaningless stimulation. Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate whether they perceived a face or
a meaningless stimulation by pressing one of two answer keys.
Results showed that visual perception of faces but not mean-
ingless stimulation corresponded to periods of “long-distance
pattern of synchronization” in the gamma band between the
left parieto-occipital areas and frontotemporal regions. In this
case, the coupling between occipital (massively involved in the
visual processing of retinal information), parietal (spatial cog-
nition and episodic memory), and fronto-temporal (recognition
and perceptual learning) regions was conceived as the neural
bases for perception. The principle of co-increasing in activation
(measured for instance by the regional cerebral blood ﬂow) in
infero-temporal and occipital areas has been conﬁrmed later in
brain imaging protocols, as being a basic neural process underly-
ing visual categorical perception of face familiarity (Rossion et al.,
2001) and other emotional inﬂuences on perception (Adolphs,
2004; Vuilleumier and Huang, 2009). Rodriguez et al. (1999) pio-
neering electrophysiological study identiﬁed electrophysiolocal
markers of brain coordination during visual perception process.
After the perception phase but before the motor one, that is
during the transition between perception and action, a desyn-
chronization was reported. Finally, when the participants were
launching the motor response, a new phase of synchronization
(involving slightly similar couplings between right temporal and
central regions in both meaningfulness conditions) was reported.
This research has shown how each phenomenological (through
the analysis of the perceptual phase), or behavioral (through the
analysis of the motor phase) activity, in this task, was embodied
in speciﬁc couplings and decoupling between neural nets. Based
on a similar electrophysiological analysis, Varela et al. (2001) have
proposed a framework for conceiving the unity of some “cogni-
tive moments” and the distributed architecture of neuroanatomy.
Coherent behavior and cognition would emerge from large-scale
integration. The underlying mechanisms would consist in the
synchronization of electrical activities “over multiple frequency
bands.” Varela et al. (2001) stressed the reciprocal nature of con-
nections in the process of integration, in opposition to the more
strictly bottom-up view of integration, in which the process is
conceived as the computations carried out between sensory and
motor areas (i.e., in “associative” areas).
More recently, Vuilleumier and Driver (2007) described the
evolution in the use of fMRI for characterizing brain contri-
bution to a given function. If early use of fMRI consisted in
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attributing functions to particular brain regions or networks,
advanced research in the domain is currently investigating how
distant regions in the brain interact with each other and change
their own activity as a function of their current connectedness
to other active regions. This trend is known as “functional inte-
gration.” Advances in the understanding of human brain provide
evidence for complex coordination between brain regions. “Func-
tional connectivity arises from context-sensitive dynamics that unfold
rapidly but are shaped by a backbone of structural connectivity
that can change only slowly” (Kleinschmidt and Vuilleumier, 2013,
p. 333). Even if bottom-up models of vision have had a consider-
able inﬂuence over the way psychologists and neuroscientists have
represented computation in visual systems (Marr, 1982), recent
neuroimagery studies provide evidence for visual cortex activity
modulation as a function of the connections between functionally
related territories.
Nir et al. (2006) found a correlation between spontaneous ﬂuc-
tuations in blood-oxygen-level–dependent (BOLD) signals related
to cortical regions – all involved in visual processing – in par-
ticipants placed in the darkness (i.e., no light illuminating the
scanning room). When participants were visually stimulated those
correlational patterns suddenly changed. Cortical regions (e.g.,
left parahippocampal place area, posterior fusiform gyrus, supe-
rior temporal sulcus, post-central sulcus, central sulcus, lateral
sulcus) exhibited large-scale synchronized slow (<1 Hz) ﬂuctua-
tions at rest. Coordinative patterns are changed as a function of
contextual inﬂuences. For any region, the latter are represented by
the activity of other connected cortical networks. When no retinal
information is received, some brain regions involved in visual pro-
cessing tend to synchronize their activity. In other words, not only
does the activation pattern depend on external stimulation, but
this pattern is also, at each point of the neural network, dependent
on its structural and functional relationships to other parts of the
network.
Vuilleumier and his colleagues have carried out a series of
studies showing that emotions and other higher cortical con-
trols involved in "attentional modulation" interact with vision at
the cerebral level (Vuilleumier et al., 2001, 2004; Mazzola et al.,
2013; see also Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier and Driver, 2007;
Vuilleumier and Huang, 2009). They have been interested in long-
range couplings between the “visual” cortices and distant regions
that have traditionally been investigated separately (i.e., amygdala,
fronto-parietal cortex). The visual effects of emotion, through
the contribution of amygdala, and the visual effects of what
the authors call “attention,” through the contribution of fronto-
parietal circuits, have similar boosting effects on the activity of the
visual cortex. They both contribute to enhance the processing of
visual stimulus.
Similarly to what has been described as contextual effects at the
behavioral level earlier in this paper, “contextual” inﬂuences occur
almost everywhere in the brain. The highly converging nets create
the biological basis for multiple couplings at different scales from
the microscale of synaptic connections to the macroscale of area
coordinations. The analysis of the coupling between brain areas,
employed in the works reported in this section, offers exciting
perspectives and should be one key element of a complex approach
to vision in the future.
In order to improve the synthesis between brain, behavioral,
and mind sciences, it would be very helpful to connect those stud-
ies involving vision with two important lines of research. The ﬁrst
line is constituted by the synergetic trend (Haken et al., 1985; Kelso,
1995, 2012; Kelso and Engstrøm, 2006; Kelso et al., 2013; Tomasi
et al., 2014), which is rarely applied to the ﬁeld of vision per se.
This trend successfully gathers different components and analyzes
their collective behavior through the tracking of order parame-
ters, which characterize theirmutual relations (e.g., phase relations
of oscillators). This framework provides models of brain activity
and behavior, by integrating the coordination of system compo-
nents. The second line has involved research carried out by Menon
(2011) and colleagues on the dynamic changes observed in the
coupling between brain components. The research has sought to
characterize psychiatric and neurological disorders. Menon con-
ceives threemajor types of functional networks and relates diseases
to speciﬁc alterations of these networks. Mechanisms underlying
the pathological alteration of information processing are contex-
tualized at different spatial scales, from abnormal small-world
architecture, to large-scale functional disconnection. His approach
does not involve the visual function, but gives interesting lends
for conceiving different types of network evolutions and different
consequences on the emergence of behaviors.
Despite the obvious intellectual contribution of the research
mentioned up to this point, two questions are still pending. The
ﬁrst is related to how different scale levels of organization of the
visual system are coordinated; the second concerns the charac-
terization of the meaning of subsystem behavioral changes: in other
words,whydoes a given component exert some speciﬁc constraints
at some times, and others later?
TOWARD BRIDGES BETWEEN SCALES OF ANALYSIS FOR A SYNTHESIS
IN “VISUAL” BRAIN CONNECTIVITY SCIENCE
As previously put forward by the 1998 Nobel Prize winner in
physics Laughlin (2005) “reliable cause-and-effect relationships in
the natural world have something to tell us about ourselves, in
that they owe their reliability to principles of organization rather
than microscopic rules.” However, if organization is central to
our issue, this takes place at different scales in the brain. Any
synthesis (which involves connecting things, ideas. . .) endeavor
in the ﬁeld of mind, brain, and behavior must account for
this multi-layered organization, within brain, and from brain to
behavior.
Evidence for the emergence of neural and behavioral activ-
ities from multiple couplings at different scale levels can be
found in studies of diseases affecting the central nervous sys-
tem. Not only do the couplings occur at multiple scales in
the brain, but also couplings occurring at different scales inﬂu-
ence each other. For instance, multiple sclerosis has recently
been considered as a disconnecting syndrome (He et al., 2009;
Kleinschmidt and Vuilleumier, 2013), in which increased func-
tional connectivity can be recorded. Though the impairment
level of neural structures in various diseases is often negatively
linked to the functional connectivity level assessed by fMRI
(Yu et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2013), the impairment of small-
word neural nets in multiple sclerosis can lead to increasing
the activity level of larger nets involving more distant regions
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within the brain (Kleinschmidt and Vuilleumier, 2013). At this
point, we realize that the increase in functional activity at a
scale level can be interpreted only if we analyze and understand
what happens at another scale level in the brain. The synthesis,
the access to the global meaning of the system behavior emerges
from the understanding of structures and events at different scales
and from the conceptual relationship that is established between
them.
Vision heavily relies on network functionality and dynam-
ics. Functionality is not over when partial impairments
of local networks are found, because dynamics is pos-
sible. Different couplings at similar or other levels can
compensate for the damage of local networks. This kind
of neural plasticity involving compensatory processes that
encompass different interactive scale levels (partially) supports
the continuity of behavioral performance and phenomeno-
logical production. Further evidence for changes in the
scale level of neural ensembles involved in vision has been
reported in deaf cats (Lomber et al., 2010). In these ani-
mals, which exhibit supranormal visual performance (e.g.,
improved peripheral target localization; lower thresholds of
movement detection) the “auditory cortex” is recruited during
visual perception. Reversible deactivations of posterior audi-
tory cortex and dorsal auditory cortex respectively suppressed
any superiority in localization and in movement detection.
Therefore, scale-dependent reorganizations involving the addi-
tion of neural territories occur in the brain to support
heightened functional performance at the visual behavioral
level.
The subject of interactions between scale levels has been
recently addressed by Kim et al. (2013), in the context of the con-
nectomeproject. They categorized recentworks in the domain into
three classes: macro-scale (inter-regional connectivity), mesoscale
(neuron level and its projections), and microscale (including all
synaptic contacts). The authors presenteddetails of most advanced
methodologies for characterizing each scale. The subsequent prob-
lem lies in the integration of information across scales, which
implies to get partial common frames of references from one scale
to another. This obviously technical issue lets basic questions con-
cerning the nature of causal links between scales unanswered. At
different levels of scientiﬁc analysis, progress in the description of
networks ismade in spite of material challenges. However, amodel
of couplings between neural activities belonging to the three scales
is still lacking.
Our review makes it salient that data have been accumu-
lated, which show that information (deﬁned electrically or
symbolically) and behavior are fundamentally dependent on
the context. The latter emerges in the brain through struc-
tural and functional connections that constitute the background
for potential coordinative patterns. Synthesizing involves gath-
ering sparse arguments and unconnected conceptual tools. We
must consider conceptual connections between what occurs at
brain, phenomenological, and behavioral levels. A major issue
for the integration of knowledge, the connection of uncon-
nected ﬁelds in science, is the understanding of the ends
of the variations. In order to shift from an operative view
on couplings and complexity to a more global perspective
where meaning can be associated with complex “computa-
tion,” an approach combining the emergence conditions of
mutual inﬂuences and the meaning of these inﬂuences should
be privileged.
MEM AND ITS DYNAMICAL ZOOM: TOWARD THE
THEORETICAL INTEGRATION OF CONNECTEDNESS AND
EMERGENT TELEOLOGY
A synthesis in the ﬁeld of mind sciences not only requires to
gather information at different scales of analysis but also to shed
light on why different systems are coupled and why their coupling
evolves with time. We need to think and model the “motivational”
forces that draw different scales of the central nervous system
as well as phenomenological states and behavior toward a given
and momentary equilibrium. However, the teleological dimen-
sions of cognition and brain dynamics are more rarely modeled.
The emerging goals that are pursued by the individual can also
(as connectedness) be described at different levels of abstraction
(Laurent, 2003). From low-levels of cognitive control over goals
to the abstract management of personal motivation, individual
forces that drive cognition must be integrated, as connectedness,
in a conceptual model of mind. If much work has been done
over the two last decades in the ﬁeld of complex neural networks,
connectedness and complex cognition, the integration of teleol-
ogy and motivation in those works is far to be achieved. In the
following paragraphs, I am presenting two descriptions of MEM
that account for the various effects reported earlier in this paper.
The ﬁrst one is developed with psychological concepts, whereas
the second one is developed with biocomputational concepts. The
goal of the procedure is to provide supplementary opportunities
for exchanges between disciplines. In both descriptions, the role
of scale interaction is being discussed.
DESCRIPTION OF MEM AT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LEVEL
Once the theoretical framework – for (i) conceiving the coupling
between a cognitive component and a larger whole, (ii) iden-
tifying the teleological dimensions emerging from the multiple
components – has been developed, methodological tools should
be coined in order to describe the macroscopic behavior of the sys-
tem. For instance, for vision, the collective behaviormaybe tracked
by the use of eye movement recording. This technique informs us
about the parts of the environment with which a human subject
interacts. This interaction is the macroscopic behavior emerg-
ing from a complex coupling between the visuomotor subsystem
and any other subsystem that is connected to the visual system.
According to MEM, the amount of visual modulation by other
subsystems depends on both the structural and the functional
connectivity. Structural connectivity is generated both innately
and as a result of individual goals and prolonged experiences with
environmental structures. This can be altered also by aging and
disease. Functional connectivity is inﬂuenced by dynamic tele-
ological pressure coming from the rest of the organism. This
pressure can be transmitted through the structural connection
within electrical and chemical systems. Knowing the structure
of the visual system is useful but not sufﬁcient in order to pre-
dict its behavior. We must re-build the ecology (both within the
body and outside the body) in order to conceive visual-motor
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dynamics. What the individual searches for in the environment
is dependent on his emergent “motivation.” Here, “motivation” is
wholly embodied and distributed in all the living system, each
component (as shown previously in the empirical part) exert-
ing a pressure on what visual search and experience ﬁnally are.
The variance in eye movements, unexplained by a single fac-
tor, can be further investigated in the framework of multiscale
couplings.
Figure 1 presents a summary of MEM organization at the psy-
chological level. This lets us draw perspectives for further empirical
research within a complex approach to perception. The inﬂu-
ence of teleological factors is embodied in perceptual and motor
activities, which are not “encapsulated,” but rather penetrated
by non-perceptual or non-motor factors with which they form
systems at different scales, that is, from the neurological to the
social-cultural scale. The conceptual synthesis in this model lies
in giving an account for evolving (and interacting) ends at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction as well as predicting their effects on
cognitive systems. In other words, this consists in considering cog-
nitive systems as essentially goal-driven, in recognizing that what
is processed fundamentally depends on the current characteris-
tics of all nets that are connected to them. The synthesis between
disciplines is only possible if researchers are able to recognize not
only that their research object is inﬂuenced by various factors per-
taining to multiple and ﬂexible scales of abstraction, but also if
they systematically engage in the description of the motivations
or teleology attached to these factors. In this framework, context-
sensitivity is a basis for the conception of open systems and the
intellectual synthesis between classically separated research ﬁelds.
The focus of MEM is both on multiscale connectedness (or func-
tional coupling) and embodied teleology (or distributed and local
autopoiesis). Connectedness is often cited as a critical factor of sys-
tem dynamics, but the scale at which this is considered is rarely
ﬂexible. Teleology is very rarely evoked. Nonetheless, as reported
in the precedent sections of this paper, the change in a subsys-
tem “needs” dramatically modiﬁes the strength of the inﬂuence
this subsystem will exert on visual search for information and
attunement to features that are critical at any given time. Tak-
ing into account these needs and their connections with visual
and mental processes allows us modeling multiscale environments
of psychological processes, and then contributing to rebuild the
ecology of mind.
The perception-action cycles are under the inﬂuence of multi-
ple embodied motivational forces (i.e., the emerging teleological
force ﬁeld). The notion of “emerging teleological force ﬁeld” refers
to the sum of electrical and chemical information emerging from
local neural nets and single neurons, which translate local con-
straints and needs into constraints for search of information,
through patterns of functional neural connections. The multiscale
enaction lies in the following principles: (i) any part of the body
plays a role in the deﬁnition of the search needs for information
and operational closure of the organism (ii) the strength of local
inﬂuences over perception-action cycles is inﬂuenced by factors
whose expression duration ranges from macrogenetic (i.e., evolu-
tionary) to microgenetic (e.g., glycemic regulation needs) scales
(iii) perception-action cycles are interfaced with different needs,
which can be associated with various levels of abstraction (iv)
the autonomous activity produced at any cellular unit or ensem-
ble of cell is an expression of the autopoietic characteristic (i.e.,
afﬁrmation of self-identity) of living units, so that cooperation
and competition are basic properties of relations between cells or
groups of cells.
A (visual) system able to take into account the initial condi-
tions of the agent is a real intelligent system, since this one has
an immediate adaptation to the dynamic or evolving goals of the
agent in which it is embedded. Therefore, understanding how
FIGURE 1 | Schematic description of MEM at the psychological level.
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different cognitive or neural systems interact becomes central to
theorizing the variance of visual perception. Furthermore, each
identiﬁed interaction between visual and non-visual processes
becomes a new opportunity of understanding and inﬂuencing
world representations and behavior. The proposed conceptual
model is empirically testable. Each of the connections represented
in the Figure 1 has already been exempliﬁed and experimentally
tested, and supporting data have been reported in our review.
However, its heuristic value is also related to the acknowledgment
that visual and motor systems are inﬂuenced by other components
that provide them with teleological perspectives. The connection
between biological-cognitive processes on the one hand, and their
meanings in a wide range of coupling contexts on the other hand, is
fundamental to the integrative science of complex living systems.
MEM is, for those reasons, in part in rupture with Maturana and
Varela (1980) assumptions according to which autopoietic systems
are strictly non-teleological. These pioneering authors had prob-
ably to distinguish between classical functionalism and teleology,
on one side, and their autopoietic systems theory, on the other
side. This was aimed at eliminating any reference to an abstract
“purpose” that would, from the external world, guide the reg-
ulation of behavior. In this sense, I agree with Maturana and
Varela’s (1980) project to naturalize our theories of human cog-
nition. There is no need to evoke any external law to the human
subject in order to found our understanding of individual reg-
ulation. This is not that external constraints do not inﬂuence
individual behavior, but rather that any meaning arises in the
context of self-referenced evaluative processes and values. How-
ever, with MEM, I propose to stress the ﬂexibility of what context
is and what the autopoietic levels should be in both our theo-
retical and empirical research. In MEM, there are multilayered
recursive loops and identity-afﬁrming processes. The whole body
is not the only autopoietic unity; at another end of the con-
tinuum, the single cell has also its own organization. Signals
processed by the cells generate recursive loops. Neural ensembles
behave through excitatory or inhibitory activity, and inﬂuence
perceptual-motor systems. In this perspective, perceptual-motor
activity in frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital areas embodies
goals, needs, emerging in distal regions. In this sense, the ends
of perceptual-motor systems are strictly emerging, by summing
local action potentials. Once again, the teleology mentioned here
is in no way similar to an external principle that would indicate,
from outside the organism, the ends of a living being, specie, or
an individual. Well before biologists, psychologists or cyberneti-
cists, Nietzsche already warned his readers against “teleological”
discourses.
“There is no denying that in the long run each of these great teachers of a
purpose was vanquished by laughter, reason and nature: the brief tragedy
always changed and returned into the eternal comedy of existence, and
the ‘waves of uncountable laughter’ – to cite Aeschylus – must in the end
also come crashing down on the greatest of these tragedians.”
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, 1882. The Gay Science.
Book One, 1, “The teachers of the purpose of existence.”
Instead of explaining the regulation of behaviors or existence
in relation to external causes, or in relation to elementary “cogni-
tive functions” that are usually thought of as if the speciﬁc context
of their evaluation did not count, I suggest to consider humans
as being made of contexts (subsystems), many of which signal
the critical environmental parts to deal with as a function of the
autopoietic necessities of the moment. The ability of these sub-
systems to orient perceptual-motor cycles can be referred to as
emerging teleological constraints. These teleological constraints
need not be symbolically represented. They are embodied through
metabolic and electrical activity, which take their meaning in
relation to local basic autopoietic units that are the cells.
DESCRIPTION OF MEM AT THE BIOCOMPUTATIONAL LEVEL
As proposed by Capra and Luisi (2014, p. 155), “[e]mergent prop-
erties are the novel properties that arise when a higher level of
complexity is reached by putting together components of lower
complexity. The properties are novel in the sense that they are not
present in the parts: they emerge from the speciﬁc relationships and
interactions among the parts in the organized ensemble.” MEM
applies this principle to teleology. In other words, the global goals
that are pursued by the individual emerge from the coordination
between multiple more elementary teleological forces at the sub-
system level. In the present paper, I reviewed the role of basic
needs, mood regulation goals, social-economical determinants.
All these “local” parameters are forces that are progressively and
hierarchically coupled to cognitive and perceptual processes.
The modalities of local needs combination and integration
should receive computational solutions. Systematic research has
to be carried out in order to reveal how vision emerges as a
consequence of information integration. For instance, careful con-
trol over needs or goals should be observed in order to measure
the effects of the strongest needs and goals of the wider agent
system at any given time, in comparison with less demanding
ones. A simple win-loose principle can be envisaged in order
to perfectly satisfy the most valued goal, but complex motiva-
tions could also lead to a multipurpose visual search connecting
different goals with vision. At a more elementary scale, MEM
is characterized by connectedness and informational exchanges
between the organism subsystems. The roles and positions in
space of these subsystems are various. In order to account for
the perceptual-motor dynamics occurring under the inﬂuence of
multiscale information integration, a hierarchical process taking
into account interactions between different parts of the system
will be proposed. Contemporary advances of theoretical biology
can be considered as foundations for some of these computa-
tions carried out by MEM. Chauvet (1993a,b,c, 2004) proposed
mathematical tools accounting for the hierarchical information
integration. In this framework, information integration is under
the constraints of several organizational factors associated to
biological systems. According to Chauvet (2004, p. 211), “the
functional organization of a biological system can be represented
by a mathematical graph in which the summits correspond to
the sources and sinks of the system and the arcs correspond to
functional interactions between them.” Chauvet takes space and
time into account. He introduces the concept of structural dis-
continuity in order to account for the propagation of functional
interaction through different milieux. If there is a discontinuity
between the source and the sink, the interaction  will need to go
through the inferior level φ. Chauvet proposes the S-propagator
(Structure-propagator) notion, which is an operator describing
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the move of activation through structural hierarchy. The S-
propagator corresponds to the following mathematical function:
Pi0 = P0φPi (2)
where the propagation between two discontinuous spaces,
the source situated at ri and the sink situated at r0,
involves the interaction φ from which it results. According
to Chauvet (2004, p. 227), three steps are required in order
to propagate the functional interaction  between different
structures:
(1) The propagation of the functional interaction within the
source, involving the operator Pi.
(2) The modiﬁcation of the interaction by the structural disconti-
nuity generating another interaction at a lower level φ.
(3) The propagation of the  interaction at the higher level in the
sink at r0.
Between distant interacting structures, other lower-level
dynamics moderate information transmission. Figure 2 illustrates
how MEM integrates those principles of theoretical biology and
relates elementary autopoietic activity to structural organization
and emergence of eye movement control and visual search of
information. Each structural space is associated with a dynamics
that contributes to shaping upcoming and downcoming infor-
mation, such that the communication between two structures
depends on both (lower-lever) elementary autopoietic dynamics
and (higher-level) integrative dynamics.
In this example, the functional interaction between the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) and the frontal eye ﬁeld (FEF) is noted 
and is allowed by the propagation of the interaction in the source
Pi toward the inferior dimensional level S (in the cingulate eye ﬁeld
[CEF]). Thepropagationof the interactionφ at theS level is shaped
by the dynamics of the CEF, such that the functional interaction at
the  level is dependent on the upcoming P0 interaction. Beyond
those solutions inspired by theoretical biology (Chauvet, 2004),
MEM relies on a principle of multiscale and emerging autopoiesis
from the cellular level to the most integrative structure that is
the organism. Instances of potential activation patterns are pre-
sented. The presence [arrow]/absence [no arrow] of cell excitatory
[blue]/inhibitory [red] signals, is a function of both local cell needs
and structural activity. Dashed arrows represent top-down con-
nections and potential modulation of upcoming information by
higher-level neural nets. The integrative autopoietic subsystem
acts as a ﬁlter of the interaction propagation between the ACC and
the FEF, and contributes to inﬂuence eye movement and search
for information.
Emerging motivational information space can be conceived as
a fundamental integrative autopoietic ﬁeld, beside the more ele-
mentary manifestation of autopoiesis at any cellular level of the
organism. Structural discontinuity between perception-memory
and action can be ﬁlled in by propagating functional interaction
through the motivational subsystem.
Multiscale Enaction Model conceives enaction as the result
of multiscale integration, self-afﬁrming of identity, and mean-
ing emergence, at different structural levels. In other words, if
MEM contributes to gather processes classically associated with
different scientiﬁc disciplines, it also recognizes the multiplic-
ity of the human being and, at the psychological level, the role
of emerging teleologies in the constitution of the perceptual-
motor Umwelt, and then, of the subjective world. As pointed
out in the elegant and huge work by Thompson (2010, p.
14): “[o]ne key point is that the enactive approach explicates
selfhood and subjectivity from the ground up by accounting
for the autonomy proper to living and cognitive beings.” It is
required, at this time of our scientiﬁc developments to better
FIGURE 2 | Biocomputational solutions to multiscale enaction in MEM.
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understand, and further research – both theoretically and empir-
ically – the process by which, a kind of operational closure
occurs through perceptual and motor processes. However, in
contrast with some “enactive approaches” that reduce the causes
of emergence to sensorimotor activity, MEM includes multi-
ple scales of determinants, ranging from cellular autopoiesis to
complex embodied social behaviors. The embodiment process of
motivation lies in the progressive hierarchical integration of local
“needs.” MEM connects embodied motivation to visual search
behaviors, perception, and the subsequently emerging subjective
world.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have proposed a model (MEM), which inte-
grates complex and dynamical approaches to vision, on the
basis of experimental results. This approach highlights the need
to consider both the connective characteristics of visual hard-
ware, and the dynamic nature of the coupling between various
bottom-up and top-down processes. The enactive multiscale view
that has been proposed, in the continuation of earlier enac-
tive proposals (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2010), is based
on empirical data showing that human visual-perceptual activ-
ity is strongly dependent on non-visual and non-motor activity.
This implies to contextualize vision in the more global frame-
work of functional hierarchical systems (Profﬁtt, 1993) that
are dynamically shaped by the current embodied needs of the
system. This differentiates the current proposal from previ-
ous enactive works more strictly based on sensorimotor loops
and contingencies. As dynamical systems, humans are made of
evolving needs (e.g., satisfying thirst, collecting speciﬁc infor-
mation, reaching a place in the physical environment), and
then what they search for in the environment changes with
time as a function of internal initial conditions. Those ini-
tial conditions conduct the human organism to enact a given
world.
The study of coordination between visual and non-visual
factors makes it urgent to develop “an embodied motivational
psychology of perception” (i.e., not conﬁned to abstract views on
elaborated or symbolically driven motivations, but based on any
teleological perspective embodied in the organism). The enactive
approach proposed here tries to capture sources of variability in
perception. In order to achieve our goals of understanding ﬁnal-
ized vision, we must understand the very nature of the respective
activities of the systems that are found to be coordinated with
vision, as well as the modes of coordination that are variously
employed by the organism as a function of time.
Conceiving artiﬁcial agents whose properties would be inspired
from those fundamental principles may also contribute to reduce
the gap between what is known about “connected cognition” in
humans and cold or “disconnected cognition” in some machines
(see Vunka Jungum and Laurent, 2009, for a discussion of this
problem in the context of emotions; and Arkin, 2005, for some
lends concerning the inclusion of emotion-related processes in
robots). Given processing time- and power-limitation of human
cognition (i.e., bounded rationality; Simon, 1956, 1957; Gigeren-
zer and Selten, 2002; Kahneman, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2013), the
modeling of couplings between vision andneeds/current priorities
may well be a strong foundation for the understanding of true
intelligent behaviors.
Finally, each revealed inﬂuence of non-perceptual factors on
perception also offers the opportunity of psychological interven-
tion in order to change psychological equilibrium. Empathy, in
the framework of psychological science, is not only a process of
goodwill and compassionate listening, but also implies to under-
stand the context in which the individual is embedded. The kind
of approach to perception developed here should facilitate the
meeting between real-world complexity and the theorization of
human mind and behavior. Any synthesis in the ﬁeld of mind,
brain, and behavior, implies to conceive complexity, which is the
quality of a systemmade of multiple entities that are related to each
other by multiple connections. Conceiving complexity at differ-
ent levels of abstraction also requires the openness of research
objects and systems in order to coordinate scientiﬁc concepts.
This kind of synthesis should not only be beneﬁcial to scientists,
but also to professional intervention in the ﬁeld of psychology.
Psychologists and human-centered professionals have not psy-
chic, biological, cognitive, or social beings to deal with. They
face whole complex systems whose behaviors emerge from the
multiple couplings between various determinants. Constituting
interactions in perception as a privileged object of psychologi-
cal science should also allow reducing the frustration of students
and professional when they shift from theory to complex and real
settings on the ﬁeld and they establish that the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts. Perception is an early process. Getting
tools in order to manipulate this primitive cognition should be
an asset to change the Umwelt of humans, that is, the percep-
tion of what the world is and what the possible actions in the
world are.
To summarize, following the presentation of MEM applied
to complexity in vision, the best way to contribute to a modern
synthesis in the ﬁeld of mind sciences is to develop and employ
a framework based on the recognition of multiscale couplings.
The latter result in the emergence of multiple embodied teleo-
logical forces (i.e., dynamic patterns of electrical and metabolic
activity), which induces – at each moment – a speciﬁc oper-
ational closure with the environment. In other words, we get
perceptually- and motor-tuned to our local and global emerg-
ing needs. Not only does this model contribute to reuniting body,
mind, and behavior, but it also achieves thematic and subdisci-
plinary connections within psychology, by connecting objects that
are usually researched independently as “functions” and that have
progressively acquired both modularity and functionality statuses,
because of the lack of theoretical, methodological, and empirical
integration (or contextual relativism).
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